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FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
Vertical Restraints on Competition 
This report addresses the application of United States "anti-
trust" - or what other nations commonly refer to as "competition" -
law to agreements between sellers and purchasers of goods and ser-
vices, when those agreements impact competition. In other words, 
this report is concerned with "vertical," as opposed to "horizontal," 
restraints (horizontal referring to agreements between competitors). 
This report will proceed in two parts. Part I will provide a broad 
overview of the relevant statutes, enforcement mechanisms, and ap-
proach ofUnited States law to vertical restraints. Part II will discuss 
how United States law currently applies to specific vertical 
restraints. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Applicable Statues 
Section 1 of the Sherman Actl is the principal statute governing 
the legality of vertical restraints that impact competition within the 
United States. Section 1 outlaws every "contract, combination ... or 
conspiracy" in "restraint of trade." All contracts, however, literally 
restrict trade to some extent because parties bound to any agreement 
lose the freedom of action that they possessed before entering into the 
agreement.2 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court inter-
prets Section 1 as prohibiting only those combinations that unreason-
ably restrain competition.3 Under this rule of reason, United States 
courts examine the impact of a challenged contract to determine 
whether, on balance, it promotes or destroys competition.4 Some-
times, however, the effect of the conduct is so plainly anticompetitive, 
and the practice so lacking of any redeeming virtue, that no elaborate 
evaluation of its impact is necessary in each case. United States 
courts deem these practices illegal per se. 5 Examples of practices 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
2. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
('Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.'). 
3. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
4. E.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 
(1978). 
5. E.g. , Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
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which are illegal per se include horizontal price fixing6 and horizontal 
division of markets. 7 (By contrast, there is no list of agreements that 
are legal per se - perhaps for the simple practical reason that such a 
list would be boundless.) 
Vertical restraints might also violate Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.s Section 2 makes it unlawful to "monopolize" or "attempt to mo-
nopolize." Establishing a monopolization claim requires showing 
that the defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, 
and willfully acquired or maintained that power, as distinguished 
from its growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident (in other words, the defen-
dant acquired or maintained its power other than through conduct 
the law seeks to promote, or at least must tolerate from anyone).9 
Establishing an attempt to monopolize requires showing that the de-
fendant engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct, with a spe-
cific intent to monopolize, and with a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.10 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike Section 1, can reach unilat-
eral conduct. Vertical restraints, however, by definition arise in 
agreements between sellers and buyers - even though the agreement 
might be the result of coercion by one party who possesses market 
power - and so vertical restraints meet the requirement that there be 
a contract, combination or conspiracy in order for Section 1 to ap-
ply.11 Discussion ofthe application of Section 2 to situations in which 
the plaintiff fails to show the existence of a vertical restraint (because 
there is no agreement as opposed to just unilateral action) is beyond 
the scope of this report. The law in the United States is not clear as 
to whether a vertical agreement involving a party with monopoly 
power might constitute monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act even though the agreement is not an unreasonable re-
straint of trade in violation of Section 1. Some United States court 
opinions, recently including the Court of Appeals decision in 
Microsoft,12 have expressed this view, and parties with monopoly 
6. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). 
7. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). 
8. 15 u.s.c. § 2. 
9. E.g. , United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
10. E.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
11. E.g. , Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 U.S. 451, 459 
n.6 (1992); Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1140 (lOth Cir. 1997) 
(en bank decision reversed a prior precedent that had held a tying contract was a 
unilateral action). This is not to say that litigation involving purported vertical re-
straints does not often raise the issue as to whether there was, in fact, an agreement 
on something that might constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade versus just 
unilateral action. See text accompanying notes 57-65, 154 infra. 
12. United States v. Microsoft Corp. , 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This was 
entirely dicta, since, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, the District Court in 
Microsoft had rejected the government's Section 1 exclu sive dealing claim based upon 
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power cannot legally make all agreements that parties without such 
power are at liberty to make.13 Yet, market power of the defendant is 
a critical factor under the rule of reason in applying Section 114 and 
so it is not clear why a vertical restraint imposed by a party with 
monopoly power would violate Section 2 but not also Section 1. 
There is also some authority for the proposition that Section 3 of 
the Clayton Actl5 might prohibit certain types of vertical restraints 
in situations not reached by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 3 
of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful to sell or lease goods on the 
condition that the purchaser or lessee does not use a competitor's 
goods, where the effect of the restriction "may be to substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act is narrower than Section 1 of the Sherman Act, even with 
respect to agreements that foreclose the buyer's dealing with compet-
itors of the seller, in that Section 3 only reaches restraints involving 
goods, whereas Section 1 can reach transactions involving goods or 
services.l6 Does Section 3 of the Clayton Act, however, ban any verti-
cal restraints not also prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act? 
The United States Supreme Court at one time suggested that Section 
3 of the Clayton Act would prohibit tying contracts in situations be-
yond those prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman ActP Similarly, 
the United States Supreme Court at one time referred to the "broader 
proscription" of exclusive dealing contracts by Section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act versus Section 1 of the Sherman Act.l8 Most subsequent Fed-
eral court decisions in the United States, however, seem to have 
ignored such distinctions, 19 and so it now appears that the main im-
pact of Section 3 of the Clayton Act has been to serve as a justification 
for applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act against tying contracts in a 
more rigorous manner than the courts otherwise might have 
undertaken. 20 
a complete misconception as to what the test was for showing such contracts were 
unreasonable. 
13. E.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach., Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 
1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
14. See text accompanying notes 112-114, 139-142 infra. 
15. 15 u.s.c. § 14. 
16. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984). 
17. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606-609 (1953). In 
Times-Picayune, the court stated that tying would be illegal under Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act if either the seller had a monopolistic position in the tying product's ma r-
ket, or the tie foreclosed a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product, but 
that the tie-in would only be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act if both condi-
tions existed. 
18. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961). 
19. E.g., Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 127 F.3d 1157, 1167 (1997); 
Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Tire 
Sound & Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 485 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
20. See, e.g., J e fferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (recit-
ing the Congressional concern with tying arrangements that led to the enact ment of 
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There is also some authority for the proposition that Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act21 might reach vertical restraints 
that do not violate either the Sherman or the Clayton Acts. Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair methods of 
competition." The United States Supreme Court has held that this 
allows the United States Federal Trade Commission to prohibit con-
duct, including vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing contracts, 
beyond the precise strictures of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 22 
The Federal Trade Commission, however, has tended to follow an ap-
proach consistent with that used by courts applying the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts to vertical restraints like exclusive dealing contracts. 23 
B. Enforcement Mechanisms 
Briefly, two federal government agencies- the United States De-
partment of Justice Antitrust Division (which can bring either civil or 
criminal actions in United States Federal courts for violations of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts24), and the United States Federal Trade 
Commission (which can issue orders to cease and desist from conduct 
that violates the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts2 5) -
have authority to prosecute antitrust claims. Private parties - to 
whom the Clayton Act grants standing to sue in Federal court for 
treble damages when injured by violations of the Sherman or Clayton 
Acts26 - bring, however, the vast majority of antitrust actions.27 This 
is particularly the case when dealing with vertical restraints, which, 
for several decades, have not been a priority for the federal enforce-
ment agencies. 
C. Overview of the United States Approach to Vertical Restraints 
Treatment of certain vertical restraints as per se illegal in the 
United States traces back to the United States Supreme Court's 1911 
decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons.28 This 
decision condemned agreements under which the manufacturer of 
proprietary medicines set the minimum price that distributors could 
charge in reselling the products. Over the next six decades, the 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act as part of the reason for continuing to treat tying as 
illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
21. 15 u.s.c. § 45. 
22. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-322 (1966). 
23. E.g., E. Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L. Harrison, UNDERSTANDING ANTI-
TRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 5.02[A][3) (4th Ed. 2003). 
24. 15 u.s.c. §§ 4, 25. 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Persons subjected to such a cease and desist order can ap-
peal to the United States Court of Appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). 
26. 15 u.s.c. § 15. 
27. Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
library. 
28. 220 u.s. 373 (1911). 
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United States Supreme Court extended per se prohibitions of vertical 
restraints also to include: certain tying contracts under which the 
seller of one product or service requires the purchaser to buy from the 
seller another product or service;29 restrictions imposed by a manu-
facturer on where and to whom distributors of its products may resell 
its products;30 and restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on the 
maximum price distributors of its products may charge in reselling 
its products. 31 
Academic commentary, often associated with the so-called Uni-
versity of Chicago school of thought, has criticized the per se prohibi-
tion of these vertical restraints. These commentators argue that a 
manufacturer normally does not restrict price and other competition 
among dealers in its products (so-called intrabrand competition) in 
order for dealers to reap supercompetitive profits, but rather to en-
courage provision of various services or other promotional efforts by 
its dealers - the incentive for which would be undermined if some 
dealers offered cut-rate prices while free-riding on the services or 
other promotional efforts of the higher priced dealers. Such services 
or other promotional efforts, in turn, will improve the manufacturer's 
ability to compete with products from other manufacturers (inter-
brand competition), or, in any event, increase sales; both of which 
would be a pro-competitive result.32 These commentators also have 
criticized the leverage theory that underlay the per se condemnation 
of tying arrangements. They argue that a party with a monopoly in 
one product normally cannot obtain additional supercompetitive prof-
its by using tying contracts to leverage its monopoly into a compli-
mentary product, because any effort to raise prices on the second 
product above competitive levels would lower the total demand for 
the combined items and thereby cut into the monopoly profits the 
producer makes on the first product.33 
A significant milestone in the United States approach to vertical 
restraints took place in the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syluania.34 Accepting the basic Chicago 
school critique of vertical restraints on intrabrand competition, the 
United States Supreme Court overruled a previous decision and held 
that territorial, location and customer restraints imposed by manu-
facturers on distributors are subject to the rule of reason, rather than 
29. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. V. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
30. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967). 
31. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
32. E.g., Lester G. Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & 
Econ. 86 (1960). Other commentators have taken a less benign view of restraints on 
intrabrand competition. E.g., Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-
Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L. Rev. 487 (1983). 
33. E.g. , Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 
(1957). 
34. 433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
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illegal per se.35 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has 
not overturned the per se condemnation of vertical minimum price 
fixing. The court's reticence seems to stem largely from various ac-
tions by the United States Congress that suggest Congress intended 
to make vertical minimum price fixing illegal. 36 The same reticence 
has not extended to vertical agreements fixing maximum prices, 
where, responding to the simple reality that lower prices normally 
are good for consumers, the United States Supreme Court, in its 1997 
decision in State Oil v. Kahn, 37 reversed an earlier decision and held 
that vertical maximum price fixing agreements are not illegal per se. 
Finally, four justices of the United States Supreme Court, in Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde,38 were ready to do away with 
the per se illegality of tying arrangements, in favor of employing the 
rule of reason. A majority of the court, however, was unwilling to 
take this step, largely based upon the view that Congress seems to 
have wanted a per se condemnation of some tying. 39 
Despite urging from academic commentators,4o as well as an 
abortive effort in the 1980s by the United States Department of Jus-
tice to establish enforcement guidelines for vertical restraints,4 1 ver-
tical restraint cases in the United States, by and large, do not reflect 
a structured analysis of pro- and anti-competitive impacts from the 
restraint. To begin with, retention of the per se prohibition ofvertical 
minimum price fiXing and tying contracts, when juxtaposed with a 
rule of reason approach under which (particularly for vertical non-
price restraints on intrabrand competition) plaintiffs rarely win, 42 
has led to a situation in which vertical restraint cases often revolve 
around attempts by plaintiffs to fit the challenged conduct within the 
category of a per se prohibition. The result in such litigation is to 
eschew evaluation of the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of the re-
straint in the case at hand, except insofar as some elements of the 
definition of per se prohibited conduct might at times provide a rough 
35. Id at 70. 
36. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) 
(Brennan J. , concurring); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 
n. 30 (1977) (pointing to Congress' repeal of the "fair trade" laws as evidencing Con-
gress' intent for vertical price fixing to be illegal per se). 
37. 522 u.s. 3 (1997). 
38. 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984). 
39. ld at 9-10. 
40. E.g., Lawrence A. Sullivan & WarrenS. Grimes, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 6.5 (2000). 
41. In 1985, the United States Department of Justice under the Reagan Adminis-
tration published guidelines for evaluating non-price vertical restraints. 50 Fed. Reg. 
6,263 (Feb. 14, 1985). After the Clinton Administration took office, the Department of 
Justice withdrew these guidelines. Division to Recall Vertical Guidelines, Expand 
Amnesty Policy for Corporations, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1627 at 
227 (Aug. 12, 1993). 
42. E.g. , Robert Pitofsky, Harvey J. Goldsmith, & Diane P. Wood, TRADE REGU-
LATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 672 (5th ed. 2003). 
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approximation of competitive impact. Yet, even application of the 
rule of reason to vertical restraints in the United States tends not to 
be a consistently structured undertaking. For one thing, the lack of 
guidance from the United States Supreme Court on how to apply the 
rule of reason to vertical restraints has allowed lower United States 
Federal courts to differ among themselves in their approach. In addi-
tion, conflicting antitrust philosophies between administrations of 
different political parties, coupled with the fact that private plaintiffs 
institute the bulk of litigation involving vertical restraints, means 
that there is no centralized enforcement criteria to impose discipline 
upon the area. 
In any event, the vast majority of rule of reason cases concerning 
vertical restraints in the United States involve either vertical non-
price (territorial, location or customer) restraints on intrabrand com-
petition, or exclusive dealing contracts. Application of the rule of rea-
son to both these situations typically begins with using market 
shares to assess the anticompetitive potential of the restraint. Yet, 
as discussed later, both what is measured and how much is enough 
for concern are different when evaluating vertical non-price re-
straints on intrabrand competition (as well as tying) - where the 
share of the defendant's sales in the relevant market serves as an 
indirect measurement of the defendant's market power and the corre-
sponding inability of the market to discipline the defendant's actions 
-as compared with exclusive dealing cases, which generally examine 
the impact of exclusive dealing contracts by considering the share of 
the market foreclosed to competitors by such contracts.43 Regardless 
of the particular restraint, however, market analysis in vertical re-
straint cases in the United States tends to be more slapdash than is 
the case in other antitrust contexts, such as evaluation of mergers 
and monopolization cases;44 for example, it is rare in the vertical re-
straint context to see any formal analysis of potential competition or 
the like. Moreover, and again in contrast to other contexts such as 
merger cases, once the defendant's market share, or the percent of 
the market foreclosed by exclusive dealing contracts, crosses an ini-
tial threshold sufficient to convince the court that there might be an 
anticompetitive effect, there generally are not any clearly articulated 
s uccessive thresholds of market power or foreclosure at which levels 
courts explicitly apply different standards in assessing a vertical fore-
closure under the rule of reason. While important in an older United 
43. See, e.g., Eastern Food Services, Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic University Services 
Ass'n , Inc., 357 F .3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2004) (the fact that a university, which agreed to 
an exclusive dealing contract with one food supplier, may have market power over 
students looking for on campus snacks is irrelevant to foreclosure of customers open 
to competing food distributors). 
44. E.g., Herber t Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE§ 11.6b (3rd ed. 2005). 
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States Supreme Court decision,45 more recent decisions by courts in 
the United States generally have not placed much significance on the 
possible cumulative impact if a number of sellers in the market em-
ploy the same vertical restraint. 46 
Beyond using the defendant's typically small market share as a 
screening device to weed out most cases as not posing any anticompe-
titive risk, court opinions in the United States dealing with non-price 
restraints on intrabrand competition have generally not undertaken 
much analysis of the actual anti-competitive impact of the restraint. 
By contrast, as discussed later in this paper, United States courts 
looking at exclusive dealing contracts will examine a number of fac-
tors beyond the percent of the market foreclosed - including duration 
of the contracts, existence of entry barriers, and actual market per-
formance -in order to assess the anti-competitive impact of exclusive 
dealing. Even in the exclusive dealing cases, however, court opinions 
in the United States do not attempt to measure the increase in the 
defendant's market power attributable to the challenged practice. 
Moreover, while some United States Federal court opinions have spo-
ken of the need for the plaintiff to prove that the "probable (not cer-
tain) effect" of the challenged vertical restraint will be to raise prices 
or otherwise injure competition,47 courts in the United States typi-
cally do not articulate any sort of precise standard against which to 
evaluate proof of an anti-competitive impact of a challenged vertical 
restraint.48 
Reflecting the different purposes for their use, the acceptable jus-
tifications (pro-competitive effects) for non-price restraints on in-
trabrand competition are somewhat different than the acceptable 
justifications for exclusive dealing contracts. The discussion later in 
this report of these specific restraints will address the commonly ac-
cepted justifications. Despite the notion that the rule of reason is 
supposed to be a balancing test, courts in the United States typically 
do not attempt to weigh the anti- versus pro- competitive impacts of 
vertical restraints; rather defendants normally prevail unless the 
plaintiff establishes market power or foreclosure sufficient to indicate 
an anti-competitive impact, and the defendant completely fails to put 
forth any sort of acceptable justification.49 
45. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309, 314 (1949). 
46. E.g., Barnosky Oils v. Union Oil Co., 582 F. Supp. 1332, 1335-37 (E.D. Mich. 
1984). 
47. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. , 749 F.2d 380, 393-394 (7th Cir. 1984). 
48. E.g., Stop & Shop Supermarket Co v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Is-
land, 373 F.3d 57, 66-68 (1st Cir. 2004); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers , 
Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982). 
49. E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 44 at § 11.6b. 
2006] VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION 365 
II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS TO 
SPECIFIC VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
A. Illegal Per Se Restraints 
1. Vertical Minimum Price Fixing 
As mentioned above,50 agreements between manufacturers and 
distributors, that set a minimum price at which the distributor can 
resell goods purchased from the manufacturer, remain illegal per se 
under United States antitrust law. While avoiding the analysis of 
competitive impacts called for under the rule of reason, the per se 
prohibition of vertical minimum price fixing agreements creates in 
the United States, as it does elsewhere,51 its own difficult legal 
issues. 
a. Use of Agents 
Naturally, it would create economic chaos if courts treat every 
instruction by a principal to an agent regarding the price at which 
the agent is to sell the principal's goods as a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. Hence, instructing such agents on the price they must 
charge does not equal illegal vertical price fixing. 52 One problem 
with this rule arises, however, when manufacturers attempt to ex-
ploit it by formally designating all of their distributors as "agents" 
and by retaining nominal title to the goods until sold to the ultimate 
consumer. In situations in which it is evident that all that is going on 
is an attempt to circumvent the antitrust law, United States courts 
will ignore the formal designation of dealers as "agents," and the for-
mal retention of title to the goods by the manufacturer, and apply the 
per se rule against vertical minimum price fixing. 53 Among the indi-
cia of whether or not the court is dealing with a bona fide agency 
situation are the vastness of the distribution network denominated 
as agents, 54 the presence of a non-price purpose for the use of 
"agents" rather than independent distributors, 55 and, most espe-
cially, the degree to which the so-called agents bear the risks of the 
non-sale or decline in value of the "consigned" product. 5 6 
50. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
51. E.g ., Volkswagen v. Commission, 2004 O.J. (C 71) 24 (the Court of First In-
stance refused to find an agreement on minimum prices when Volkswagen sent circu-
lars to its German dealers exhorting them to maintain "strict price discipline" and not 
to grant discounts to customers on its WV Passat). 
52. E.g. , United States v. General Electric Co. , 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Acquaire v. 
Canada Dry Bottling Co. of N.Y. , 24 F.3d 401, 409-411 (2d Cir. 1994). 
53. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
54. Id at 20. 
55. E.g. , Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, 889 F .2d 751, 752 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
56. E.g. , Ryco Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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b. Proof of an Agreement on Price 
Finding the existence of a vertical price fixing agreement 
presents a different challenge than generally exists when dealing 
with horizontal price fixing, since, unlike competitors (who normally 
have no business contracting with each other), manufacturers must 
contract with their distributors. The question is whether such con-
tracts contain an agreement on minimum prices. 
For example, suppose a manufacturer announces the prices it 
wishes distributors of its product to charge, and that it will not sell to 
distributors charging less than such prices: Does any subsequent 
purchase of goods by a distributor from the manufacturer constitute 
the dealer's acceptance of a minimum price fixing agreement? In 
United States v. Colgate,57 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the answer is no. In Colgate, the court reasoned that if the 
agreement between the manufacturer and distributor "allowed" the 
distributor to sell at whatever price the distributor chose, then the 
manufacturer's announcement of suggested prices, even when cou-
pled with the manufacturer's announced refusal to sell to distributors 
who had disregarded those prices, constitutes unilateral conduct, 
rather than a combination or agreement in restraint of trade. 58 
The problem with Colgate is that it constructs a critical legal edi-
fice on a rather artificial distinction. Given that vertical minimum 
price fixing is illegal, the only practical sanction available to punish a 
dealer, who breaks a promise to adhere to minimum prices, is to cut 
off the dealer from future business. Under this circumstance, there is 
no realistic difference between an agreement between manufacturer 
and dealer for the dealer to charge a certain price - punishable by 
termination of the dealer if the dealer breaches the agreement - and 
the so-called unilateral action of a manufacturer announcing that it 
will cut off any dealer who does not adhere to the manufacturer's sug-
gested price, and the dealer's subsequent adherence to the suggested 
price. 
Subsequent cases applying Colgate illustrate both the fine dis-
tinctions it requires, as well as the tendency of courts to apply or dis-
tinguish the case with an eye toward the court's overall opinion of 
vertical minimum price fixing. During an era in which the United 
States Supreme Court was sympathetic toward the per se prohibition 
of vertical price fixing, decisions of the court narrowed the reach of 
Colgate. For example, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,59 the 
court found a conspiracy between the manufacturer and wholesalers, 
rather than unilateral conduct protected under Colgate. This con-
spiracy consisted of the manufacturer's enlisting the "participation" 
57. 250 u.s. 300 (1919). 
58. ld at 307. 
59. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
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of the wholesalers in enforcement of the manufacturer's pricing policy 
by threatening to cut off sales to any wholesaler who sold to retailers 
that did not follow the manufacturer's suggested retail price.60 
By the time the United States Supreme Court decided Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,61 the court's attitude toward vertical 
restraints had changed. Actually, Monsanto is a somewhat schizo-
phrenic decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against 
the defendant; finding adequate evidence of an agreement on prices 
in the existence of several communications by the manufacturer to its 
distributors complaining about their pricing and threatening them 
with termination.62 This reaffirms that, even in an era in which 
United States courts are more skeptical of the prohibition on vertical 
price fixing, manufacturers who attempt to cajole compliance with 
price guidelines through repeated threats overstep the bounds of uni-
lateral conduct allowed by Colgate. On the other hand, Monsanto 
limits the ability to find a combination between the manufacturer 
and the non-terminated distributors simply because the manufac-
turer terminates a price cutting distributor following complaints 
about price cutting from distributors who are maintaining prices sug-
gested by the manufacturer. The Supreme Court stated that the 
mere termination of a price cutting distributor, even if in response to 
complaints from other distributors, is not sufficient to prove the exis-
tence of an agreement to maintain prices between the manufacturer 
and the complaining distributors; rather, the plaintiff must produce 
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer 
and the complaining distributors were acting independently (in other 
words, the plaintiff must show there was a quid pro quo from the 
complaining distributors in exchange for the manufacturer's termi-
nating the price cutter).6 3 
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,64 the 
United States Supreme Court went one step further when it comes to 
terminating price cutting distributors following complaints from 
other distributors. The plaintiff must do more than show that the 
termination was not independent of the complaint -which the plain-
tiff in Business Electronics presumably was able to do, since the ter-
mination followed an "it is either him or me" ultimatum from a 
powerful distributor, who threatened to no longer carry the manufac-
turer's product if the manufacturer sold to the price cutting distribu-
tor. The plaintiff must also show an agreement between the 
60. ld at 31-34. 
61. 465 u.s. 752 (1984). 
62. Id at 765. 
63. Id at 763. 
64. 485 u.s. 717 (1988). 
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manufacturer and the retained distributor in which the distributor 
consents to maintain prices. 6 5 
The fact that the United States Supreme Court in Monsanto and 
Business Electronics dealt with cut-off distributors is a reflection of 
the reality that dealer terminations provide a fertile source of private 
antitrust plaintiffs. Nevertheless, other incentives that manufac-
tures provide for dealers to stick to suggested prices may be chal-
lenged as being, in effect, a vertical minimum price fixing agreement. 
For example, while simple cooperative advertising programs, in 
which the manufacturer offers to subsidize the dealers' advertising 
expenses, do not constitute illegal vertical price fixing - even though 
the manufacturer may condition the subsidy on the dealers' not in-
cluding any price information (other than perhaps the manufac-
turer's suggested retail price) in the subsidized ads66 - the United 
States Federal Trade Commission has found conduct illegal where 
manufacturers have gone further and conditioned the advertising 
subsidy on the dealers' not advertising prices below the manufac-
turer's suggested retail price even in advertisements paid for entirely 
by the dealers.67 Along the same lines, the United States Federal 
Trade Commission has found rebates offered by a manufacturer to its 
dealers only on sales made by the dealers at or above the manufac-
turer's suggested prices to be illegal- at least in a case in which the 
rebates produced the dealers' entire profit margin. 68 
2. Tying 
As stated above,69 the United States Supreme Court continues to 
treat tying arrangements, under which the seller agrees to sell one 
65. Id at 733-34. For a similar result in a very recent decision by an intermediate 
United States Federal appellate court, see Euromodas, Inc. u. Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 
11 (1st Cir. 2004). While the opinion in Business Electronics reflects the Supreme 
Court's skepticism as to the per se condemnation of vertical minimum price fixing, in 
fact, the Supreme Court's earlier decision to judge vertical non-price restraints under 
the rule of reason logically compelled the result in Business Electronics. After all, the 
impact of the manufacturer's decision to cut off the plaintiff distributor at the behest 
of the more powerful distributor effectively was to grant the more powerful distribu-
tor an exclusive distributorship; which is an action judged under the rule of reason. 
See text accompanying note 126 infra. As this discussion makes clear, the manufac-
turer's conduct in Business Electronics should still be open to challenge under the rule 
of reason, since there was an agreement; it just was not an agreement to maintain a 
price. By contrast, failure to rebut Monsanto's presumption that the manufacturer 
and the non-terminated distributors were acting independently would mean that 
there was no contract, combination or conspiracy to subject to the rule of reason (other 
than the obviously reasonable contracts selling goods to the non-terminated 
distributors). 
66. E.g., In re the Advertising Checking Bureau, 109 F.T.C. 146 (1987). 
67. E.g. , In the matter of Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 2000 WL 689147 (FTC, 
May 10, 2000) (albeit, the FTC stated that it was applying the rule of reason, rather 
than per se illegality, to this case). 
68. In re American Cyanamid, 123 F.T.C. 1257 (1997). 
69. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
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item (the tying product or service) to the buyer only on the condition 
that the buyer also purchases a second item (the tied product or ser-
vice) from the seller, as a practice that is illegal per se under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act - as well as, in situations involving goods, vio-
lating Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 70 The designation of tying as ille-
gal per se is somewhat misleading, however, since the elements 
required to establish the existence of an illegal tie-in (under either 
statute) call for a more extended analysis of the economic impact of 
the conduct than is the case in applying the per se rule in other con-
texts. Specifically, in order to establish the existence of an illegal tie-
in, the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the tied item is a sepa-
rate product or service from the tying item; (2) the seller requires 
buyers to purchase the tied item if the buyers wish to purchase the 
tying item; (3) the seller possesses some sort of advantage (market 
power) with respect to the tying item that makes buyers agree also to 
purchase the tied item; and ( 4) the tie must foreclose a "not insub-
stantial" amount of commerce to competitors of the seller.71 Even if 
the plaintiff establishes the existence of these elements, a court 
might nevertheless look at the justification for and reasonableness of 
the tie-in. 
a. Two Products or One? 
The fact that shoemakers sell shoes in pairs consisting of a right 
and a left shoe, and, depending on the design, complete with shoe-
laces -instead of separately selling right shoes, left shoes, and laces -
illustrates that a threshold question in a tying case is whether the 
defendant is tying together separate products or services, rather than 
simply selling one product or service. The United States Supreme 
Court, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,72 set out the 
basic criteria for finding the existence of separate products: There 
must be sufficient consumer demand for the purchase of the tied 
product separately from the tying product so that it would be efficient 
to offer the tied product separately from the tying product. Among 
the facts the court in Jefferson Parish listed as evidencing the ability 
to sell efficiently the tied product (in that case, anesthesiology ser-
vices) separately from the tying product (in that case, hospitalization) 
were the separate billing for the two items, the request by doctors for 
specific anesthesiologists, consumer differentiation between anesthe-
siology and other hospital services, the practice of other hospitals in 
allowing separate purchase of anesthesiology services, and the avail-
70. E.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 
458 (1936). 
71. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984); 
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional 
Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1546 (lOth Cir. 1995). 
72. 466 u.s. 2, 21 (1984). 
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ability of other anesthesiologists who could have provided the ser-
vices at the defendant hospital.73 The United States Supreme Court 
applied the same test in its most recent opinion on tying - Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 74 In Kodak, the court 
specifically rejected the argument that because there was a func-
tional relationship between the tying product (parts to repair Kodak 
photocopy machines) and the tied product (Kodak photocopy machine 
repair service) - one was generally useless without the other - that 
there was only one product. 75 
Instead of looking at consumer demand, some lower United 
States Federal courts have shoehorned into the "are they separate 
products?" issue an evaluation of the reasons for the alleged tying of 
separate items by the defendant: If there is some value to the con-
sumer from the combination -lower cost or better utility- than the 
court will treat the combination as involving one product rather than 
two. 76 This sort of evaluation of utility in a particular case can be 
highly difficult since the practical utility of combining possible sepa-
rate products into one package is often a contestable matter of trade-
off's. For example, physical integration of items (technological ties) 
often may involve complicated engineering trade-offs in which the 
combination of components may enhance one performance attribute, 
while, at the same time, degrading some other performance attribute. 
To avoid delving into such complex questions, courts might be 
tempted to treat as one product any combination for which the seller 
could make a plausible claim of some advantage. 77 This approach, 
however, risks allowing sellers, whose purpose for the combination is 
anticompetitive, to avoid legal sanction by a post hoc rationalization 
of some advantage based upon looking only at the positive half of an 
engineering or other trade-off. 
b. Requiring Purchase of the Tied Item 
Just as the existence of a vertical price fixing agreement is often 
a contestable issue, so the question of whether the seller is insisting 
on a tie-in often might be in dispute. In the simplest case, the seller 
might deny that it refused to sell the tying item unless purchasers 
also bought the tied item. After all, the mere fact that a contract 
commits a purchaser to buy more than one product from the seller 
73. Id. Actually, the United States Supreme Court may have expressed the test 
upside-down when it asked if there is sufficient demand for the purportedly tied item 
separately from the tying item. Hovenkamp, supra note 44 at § 10.5a. 
74. 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992). 
75. ld at 463. Despite the Supreme Court's rejecting this functional relationship 
argument, some lower United States Federal court judges refuse to get the message. 
Digetal Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, 73 F.3d 756, 761-2 (7th Cir. 1996). 
76. E.g. , Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980). 
77. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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does not mean there is a tie-in. Such contracts exist all the time. The 
question is whether the contract resulted from the purchaser's desire 
to obtain more than one product from the seller, rather than the 
seller's insistence that purchase of the tied product accompany the 
purchase of the tying product. 78 Of course, certain contracts, such as 
ones requiring all future purchases of the allegedly tied product to be 
from the seller, might allow the inference that the seller insisted on a 
tie-in.79 Also, large disparities in bargaining power between the 
seller and the purchasers might make a court willing to find that 
even not too subtle hints effectively communicated the seller's insis-
tence on a tie-in.so 
Suppose, instead of insisting that it will only sell the tying item 
on the condition that the purchaser also buy the tied item, the seller 
takes some action that rewards the combined purchase or penalizes 
the separate purchase. Pricing combined purchases significantly less 
than separate purchases (so-called package discounts) can constitute 
a tie-in, just as much as a refusal to sell the tying item without the 
tied.81 On the other hand, discounts that do no more than pass on to 
the buyer the seller's cost savings from combined purchases are not a 
tie-in.82 
Jefferson Parish illustrates another tying mechanism. In Jeffer-
son Parish, an exclusive dealing contract between a hospital and an 
anesthesiology group, that denied hospital privileges to other anes-
78. E.g., Paladin Assoc., Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1159-1162 
(9th Cir. 2003) (disproof of insistence on a tie-in when only half of the customers for 
tying item also bought so-called tied item, and customers who bought allegedly tied 
item testified that they did so because they perceived it as a better value). But see 
Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1127 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that 
coercive insistence on a tie-in is not part oftying case when contract commits buyer to 
purchase both tying and tied products from seller). The question of whether the seller 
insisted on a tying arrangement, however, is a somewhat different question than 
whether a buyer, who was faced with the seller's insistence on a tying arrangement, 
might still have purchased the tied product from the seller even without the seller's 
insistence on a tie-in. E.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 449 (3d Cir. 
1977) (holding that the plaintiff does not need to prove that, without the tie-in, buyers 
would have purchased the tied item from someone other than the defendant). 
79. E.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F .2d 1307, 1328 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
80. E.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223,228-9 (1968). But see Borschow Hosp. 
& Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Cesar Castillo, Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (threats to 
withhold sales of tying product, unless buyer purchased tied product, did not create 
unlawful tying arrangement when the threats were never carried out). 
81. E.g., Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 
(4th Cir. 1969) (huge disparity in price between package and separate purchase was a 
tie-in). Indeed, the prohibition in Section 3 of the Clayton Act expressly includes set-
ting a price conditional on the buyer not using goods from a competitor. 
82. E.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 54-54 (1962). The cases are in 
conflict on whether "buy-one item, get a different item free" deals constitute tying. 
Compare Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profes-
sional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1548 (10th Cir. 1995), with Marts v. Xerox, 77 
F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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thesiologists, effectively tied the patient's use of the hospital to the 
use of the anesthesiology group. This sort of physical, rather than 
written out in the contract, tie often exists when products consist of 
components that many consumers might have preferred to purchase 
separately. United States v. Microsoft Corp. 83 is the most famous re-
cent case with such a technological tie-in. There, Microsoft bundled 
its browser software (Internet Explorer) with its operating system 
software (Windows), for example, by requiring personal computer 
manufacturers who installed its Windows operating system not tore-
move the Internet Explorer software that came with the Windows 
softw<~.re, and even by designing the Windows software (in the case of 
Windows 98) in such a manner that consumers using Windows could 
not remove easily the Internet Explorer software. The court treated 
this as a tie-in.84 
Finally, suppose, instead of insisting that the purchaser buy a 
tied product from the seller itself, the seller insists that the pur-
chaser buy from a specified third party. If the seller is getting some 
financial gain from the sales made by the third party, this can consti-
tute a tie-in.85 
c. Power to Coerce Acceptance 
In a well-functioning competitive market, a seller's insistence 
that a purchaser buy a tied product if the purchaser wants the tying 
product would be met by purchasers, who did not like the tie-in, buy-
ing from someone else. Hence, a critical question in tying cases in the 
United States is whether the seller had some sort of power to compel 
acceptance of the tie-in. In early United States Supreme Court tying 
decisions, the tying product was often patented, from which fact the 
court seems to have presumed, without discussion, the power to co-
erce acceptance. 86 Since then, the Supreme Court has struggled re-
83. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
84. Id at 61. Some courts seem unable to locate the tie-in agreement in the case of 
a technological or physical tie-in. E.g., Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
703 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to find that the design of a new camera so 
that it would only take the defendant's new film was a tie-in, since there was no con-
tract by the purchasers agreeing to the tie and so no Section 1 violation). This ignores 
the fact that an implicit term in a contract selling or leasing goods is the design of the 
goods in question. 
85. E.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228 (1968). 
86. E.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 
463 (1936). The court's approach in these cases ignores the fact that, while patents 
provide monopolies, they might not provide much market power if there exist equally 
desirable substitutes. In the 1990s, Congress amended the patent law to recognize in 
the context of patent abuse (albeit not antitrust litigation) that conditioning the right 
to use patented items on the purchase of something else was not illegal without the 
showing of market power. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). Along tne same lines, United States 
Federal courts are increasingly skeptical of claims that the mere existence of a copy-
right or trademark for the tying product establishes market power. E.g., Mozart Co. 
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (trade-
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peatedly to determine if defendants engaged in tying had adequate 
power to coerce acceptance so as to justify per se condemnation. 87 
In its most recent tying decisions, the United States Supreme 
Court has gotten arguably more sophisticated in its market power 
analysis. In Jefferson Parish, the court rejected the existence of mar-
ket power based upon the fact that 70 percent of the patients in the 
defendant hospital's geographic area went to other hospitals (in other 
words, the defendant had only a 30 percent share in the relevant 
market).88 On a more liberal note, in Kodak, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Kodak had market power- despite its admit-
ted lack of power in the market for photocopy machines89 -because of 
its virtual monopoly as a source of spare parts for Kodak machines. 90 
Significantly (and controversially), in deciding to focus on the 
mark); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676-677 (6th Cir. 
1986) (copyrighted software). But see MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp., 
171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court recently 
granted review to a decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit (Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. , 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)) in a case that may clarify this area. In this case, the holder of a patent on a 
print head used for printing bar codes required licensees to buy ink from it. In a 
compromise between demanding that the plaintiff undertake an independent market 
analysis at one extreme, versus treating a patent as automatically establishing mar-
ket power at the other extreme, the Court of Appeals held that the existence of a 
patent creates a rebuttable presumption that the patent holder has market power 
sufficient to render the tie-in illegal per se. 
87. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 
(1953) (being the publisher of the sole morning and one of two afternoon newspapers 
in the city was insufficient market power to condemn a requirement that parties de-
siring to advertise in the morning paper also had to advertise in the afternoon paper); 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) (land in desirable locations 
gave sufficient market power to compel purchasers of land to agree to ship goods on 
defendant's railroad; widespread agreement to the tie-in was itself evidence of power); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977) 
(highly favorable loans did not reflect any power other than a willingness to offer 
favorable loan terms to induce purchase of high priced prefab homes). 
88. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984). In con-
trast to Jefferson Parish's refusal to find market power against a defendant that had 
only 30 percent of the market, a recent United States Federal District Court decision 
found that a defendant, who controlled four out of six Denver rock music radio sta-
tions representing 60 to 70 percent of the market, had adequate market power to 
constitute a tie-in as illegal per se. Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Chan-
nel Communications, Inc. , 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1093-1094 (D. Colo. 2004). One im-
pact of Jefferson Parish's focus on the defendant's power in (or share of) a defmed 
market is to force plaintiffs to introduce evidence on market definition. E.g. , Surgical 
Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No.1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 309 F.3d 
836, 842 (5th Cir. 2002) (insufficient evidence defining geographic market was fatal to 
a tying claim). Another impact of this focus is to raise questions as to the continued 
viability of earlier cases that found market power based upon the tying product's "uni-
queness" without regard to market definition and share. E.g., Bell v. Cherokee Avia-
tion Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1127-1130 (6th Cir. 1981) (defendant controlled desirable 
land at airport). 
89. Kodak had only a 23 percent share in the market for photocopy machines. 
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Kodak, 903 F2d 612, 616 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1990). 
90. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 U.S. 451, 482 
(1992). 
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aftermarkets for repair parts and services, instead of the initial mar-
ket for photocopy machines, the court rejected the argument that any 
attempt by Kodak to exploit its parts monopoly by tying high priced 
Kodak repair services would simply lead customers to purchase other 
brands of photocopy machines. The court explained that the tie-in 
could exploit those customers who lacked the sophistication or suffi-
cient information to estimate future repair costs when purchasing 
photocopiers, and, in addition, the tie-in could exploit those custom-
ers who bought Kodak equipment before Kodak instituted the tie-in 
and for whom switching machines would be expensive.91 
d. Foreclosure of a Not Insubstantial Amount of 
Competition 
The final element to establish an illegal per se tie-in turns out 
most of the time to be trivial. While the plaintiff must show some 
quantitative impact to the tie-in in terms of dollars of sales foreclosed 
to other competitors,92 the amount required is not large.93 Under 
United States Supreme Court decisions, about the only significance 
to the foreclosure of competition element would be excluding a tie-in 
contract that affects just one customer, or tie-in contracts that force 
customers to purchase something they did not want at all, and, 
hence, would not have purchased from a competitor of the defendant 
anyway.94 There is one other impact to this last element of an illegal 
per se tying claim. Lack of foreclosure of competition could provide a 
doctrinal explanation for the refusal of courts in the United States to 
treat the requirement that a dealer carry a manufacturer's entire 
product line, as a condition of carrying any of the manufacturer's 
products (so-called full line forcing), as an illegal tie-in - since such 
full line forcing does not preclude the dealer's buying from other 
manufacturers. 95 
e. Reasonableness Reconsidered 
Even though tying is listed as illegal per se, at least upon proof of 
the four elements set forth above, some United States Federal courts 
91. !d. at _. The divided responses of commentators to the Kodak decision re-
flects a fundamental disagreement between those who view the role of the antitrust 
laws as limited to promoting economic efficiency, and those who think these laws 
should serve a broader consumer protection purpose, including protecting consumers 
from tactics that exploit consumers' lack of information or sophis tication. Compare 
Hovenkamp, supra note 44 at § 10.3b, with Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 40 at 
§ 7.2c5. 
92. E.g., Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 393, 447 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
93. E.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962) ($60,000 from tied 
product was enough ); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1425-26 
(9th Cir. 1995)($100,000 was enough). 
94. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist . No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-12 (1984). 
95. E.g., Smith Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (10th Cir. 
1989). 
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have been willing to consider the justifications asserted by the defen-
dant for the tying arrangement, such as maintenance of product qual-
ity and protection of the defendant's goodwill.96 The result is to blur 
further the distinction between per se illegality and the rule of reason 
when it comes to tying. 
Of potentially more significance is the 2001 Microsoft decision by 
the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit.97 
As discussed earlier, this case involved a physical tie-in between 
Microsoft's Windows operating system and its Internet Explorer 
browser. Because of concern about stifling innovation, the Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court should have applied the rule of rea-
son, rather than per se illegality, to this tie-in.98 Two facts, however, 
render the significance of this decision uncertain. First, because the 
Court of Appeals condemned Microsoft's conduct as monopolization in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Justice Department 
decided not to appeal the decision about the Section 1 tying claim to 
the United States Supreme Court- thereby confining the preceden-
tial value of the Court of Appeals' decision on tying. Also, the Court 
of Appeals limited its tying holding to claims based upon physically 
bundling operating systems and application software products to-
gether;99 thereby leaving open the question of whether the court in-
tended to replace per se condemnation of tying for all products in 
markets characterized by rapid product innovation, or whether this 
was simply a decision about certain types of software. 
3. Reciprocal Dealing 
The law in the United States with respect to reciprocal dealing -
in which a prospective purchaser demands that the seller agree to 
96. E.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. 
Pa.), affd per curium, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (the court refused to find that the defen-
dant's forcing buyers to purchase an entire community antenna system as a package 
from the defendant was an illegal tie-in during the first few years after the defendant 
introduced the system into the market, because the combined sale ensured the system 
worked and protected the seller's goodwill; but, as the industry developed, this justifi-
cation no longer applied and the tie-in became illegal); Levine v. BellSouth Corp., 302 
F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (the court declined to find an unlawful tying 
arrangement when the defendant telephone company refused to supply DSL Internet 
service unless a customer also took local telephone service from the defendant, be-
cause, absent an interconnection agreement, the defendant could not provide DSL 
service over a local phone line offered by a different telephone company). 
97. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
98. Id at 84. Hence, the rule of reason like approach recently used by the Euro-
pean Commission in condemning Microsoft for tying Microsoft's Media Player 
software to the Windows operating system (Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Com-
mission Decision of 24 Mar 2004, online at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competi-
tionlantitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf) is consistent with the United States 
Court of Appeals' decision involving tying by Microsoft, even if the European Commis-
sion's approach is not consistent with the continued per se prohibition of tying in the 
United States, other than in the Microsoft case. 
99. 253 F.3d at 47. 
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buy from the purchaser before the purchaser will agree to buy from 
the seller- is much less developed than is the case with tying. Proba-
bly the most authoritative statement from the United States Su-
preme Court on the practice came in an opinion in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a Federal Trade Commission decision to block 
a merger, based upon the concern that the merger would lead tore-
ciprocal dealing.100 Lower United States Federal court decisions that 
have addressed reciprocal dealing usually have treated it like tying: if 
the plaintiff can show that the buyer, who is demanding such dealing, 
has market power as a buyer, then the court will condemn the recip-
rocal dealing as illegal per se.101 The rationale behind this result is 
also similar to tying: the concern is that the defendant is trying to 
leverage its power in one market into power in another market.102 
The only difference is that the defendant is trying to leverage power 
as a buyer (monopsony power) in one market into power as a seller in 
another market, rather than trying to leverage power as a seller in 
one market into power as a seller in another. 10 3 
B. Restraints Subject to the Rule of Reason 
1. Vertical Maximum Price Fixing 
As discussed above,104 in 1997, the United States Supreme Court 
overturned the prior rule that agreements under which manufactur-
ers impose maximum (as opposed to minimum) prices at which dis-
tributors can resell products purchased from the manufacturer are 
illegal per se, and instead held that United States Federal courts will 
evaluate such agreements under the rule of reason. Since then, al-
most no plaintiff has even attempted to show that a particular verti-
cal maximum price agreement was unreasonable. 10 5 
2. Tying in the Absence of Market Power 
In Jefferson Parish, the United States Supreme Court pointed 
out that the failure to establish the market power prerequisite for per 
100. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp. , 380 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1965). 
101. E.g., Brokerage Concepts Inc. v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 
511 (3d Cir. 1998). 
102. E.g., Betaseed, Inc. v. U and I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). 
103. Needless to say, the same criticisms of the leverage theory, and suggestions 
that the conduct may have more subtle pro- or anti-competitive effects, exist with 
respect to reciprocal dealing as exist with tying. E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 44 at 
§ 10.8. 
104. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
105. E.g., Kahn v. State Oil Co., 143 F.3d 362, 363-4 (7th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff 
waived rule of reason claim for vertical maximum price fixing); Mathias v. Daily News 
L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (plaintiffs complaint for vertical 
maximum price fixing dismissed for failure to allege relevant market as necessary for 
a rule of reason claim). But see Blanchard & Co. v. Barrick Gold Corp., 2003-2 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 'II 74,172 at 97,491 (E.D. La. 2003) (vertical agreement depressing prices 
for gold may hurt customers buying gold for investment). 
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se condemnation of a tie-in still leaves open the possibility of attack-
ing the tie-in under the rule of reason.106 The court in that case did 
not find the tie-in was unreasonable, and it is difficult to see how 
such a challenge could succeed in the face of a finding that the defen-
dant lacked the market power to coerce acceptance of the tie-in.107 
3. Vertical Territorial, Location, and Customer Restrictions 
As discussed above, 108 in its groundbreaking decision in Sylva-
nia, the United States Supreme Court reversed the prior rule that 
restraints imposed by a manufacturer on the territories in which 
dealers could resell the manufacturer's products, or the locations 
from which dealers could resell the manufacturer's products, or the 
customers to whom the dealers could resell the manufacturer's prod-
ucts, were illegal per se. Now, all such non-price vertical restraints 
imposed by manufacturers on intrabrand competition are subject to 
the rule of reason. Application of this rule can confront United States 
Federal courts with two issues: (1) how does the court decide if aver-
tical non-price restraint on intrabrand competition in a particular in-
stance is reasonable? and (2) when is the restraint in front of the 
court a vertical non-price restraint, and when it is something else 
still subject to per se illegality? 
a. Applying the Rule of Reason to Vertical Territory, 
Location and Customer Restrictions 
The Supreme Court in Sylvania did not spend time discussing 
how to apply the rule of reason to vertical non-price restraints on in-
trabrand competition, nor has the issue come back before the United 
States Supreme Court. The result has been to leave lower United 
States Federal courts to figure this out for themselves. In the years 
since Sylvania, several patterns have emerged from lower Federal 
court opinions in the United States applying the rule of reason to 
such agreements. 
To begin with, contrary to the traditional notion that the rule of 
reason is supposed to balance anti- and pro-competitive impacts from 
the restraint in question, lower Federal courts, with a notable excep-
tion, 109 have not demanded a showing of pro-competitive justifica-
106. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28 (1984). 
107. E.g., CCBN.COM, Inc. v. Thomson Fin., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154-55 (D. 
Mass. 2003); Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 743 F. Supp. 
353, 357-59 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992). But see In re Wireless 
Telephone Servs. Antitrust Litig., 2003-2 Trade Case (CCH) 'II 74,133 at 97,201-02 
(S.D.N.Y., 2003) (dismissing illegal per se, but not rule of reason, tying claim). 
108. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra. 
109. Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) (in the absence of a 
legitimate purpose for a "warranty fee" demanded by the manufacturer from dealers 
on products sold outside their assigned territories, the fee was illegal under the rule of 
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tions for vertical territorial, customer or location restraints until the 
plaintiff demonstrates some anti-competitive impact (beyond simply 
that. the restraint, by its nature, limits intrabrand competition).110 
Some courts reach this result by stating that the law is only con-
cerned with interbrand competition111 -hence precluding the need 
for balancing by rendering the reduction in intrabrand competition 
irrelevant. More commonly, lower Federal courts have used the de-
fendant manufacturer's share of the interbrand market as a screen-
ing device to determine the potential for any anti-competitive impact 
-the theory being that competition from other brands of the product 
in question will discipline dealers of products produced by manufac-
turers who lack market power, even if the dealers are protected from 
intrabrand competition.112 Under this approach, a manufacturer's 
market share of less than 20 percent or thereabouts becomes fatal to 
the plaintiffs claim113 - as is the plaintiffs failure to produce evi-
dence defining the relevant market114 or establishing the manufac-
turer's share115 - while one of the few victories for a plaintiff under 
the rule of reason came against a manufacturer that had over 70 per-
cent of the market.116 
Assuming the plaintiff gets past the market power barrier, 
courts will examine the justifications offered by the defendant for the 
restraint. While there are numerous specific justifications, they often 
fit into two broad camps: encouraging dealers to spend money and 
effort promoting the manufacturer's products -including providing 
pre- or post-sale service - by removing the concern about competing 
dealers free riding on the promotional efforts;117 and ensuring prod-
uct quality and efficiency by limiting distribution channels.118 
Courts differ significantly on the degree to which they seriously scru-
tinize the manufacturer's justifications in the particular case. A few 
have rejected the application of the proffered justification to the par-
ticular restraint at hand when the evidence showed some other moti-
vation by the defendant, 119 application of the restraint did not fit the 
reason - even though the manufacturer was not shown to have significant market 
power). 
110. E.g., Ryco Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987) 
111. See, e.g., Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 806-
809 (6th Cir. 1988). 
112. E.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
113. E.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 318 (8th Cir. 1986). 
114. E.g., Triple 7, Inc. v. Intervet, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 988 (D. Neb. 2004). 
115. E.g., Ezzo's Invest., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc. , 243 F.3d 980, 988 (6th 
Cir. 2001). 
116. Graphic Products v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1983). 
117. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
118. E.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, 561 F.2d 807, 811 (lOth Cir. 
1977). 
119. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1012-13 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(minutes suggesting ulterior motive). 
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justification, 120 there was no basis in fact for the concern expressed 
by the manufacturer, 121 or less onerous means existed for the manu-
facturer to achieve its professed aims.122 Numerous courts, however, 
have done little more than repeat and accept without question pro-
fessed, or even just possible, justifications for challenged restraints 
on non-price intrabrand competition.t23 
b. Characterization Issues Regarding Purported Vertical 
Non-price Restraints 
Given the difficulty of prevailing under the rule of reason, anti-
trust plaintiffs in the United States attempt to avoid the characteri-
zation of the restraint in question as a vertical non-price restraint. 
Earlier, this paper discussed the common attempt to cast the action 
as vertical price fixing. Alternatively, plaintiffs may attempt to char-
acterize the conduct as a horizontal restraint. One possibility for 
characterizing the restraint as horizontal occurs if the manufacturer, 
itself, also distributes its product at the wholesale or retail level in 
potential competition with independent distributors upon whom the 
manufacturer has placed territorial, location or customer limitations 
(so-called "dual distribution"). In the absence of a binding decision 
from the United States Supreme Court on dual distribution, lower 
Federal courts in the United States have taken different approaches. 
Some had categorized the restraint as horizontal and illegal per se.124 
The overwhelming trend among lower courts, however, is to treat re-
strictions in dual distribution situations as vertical and apply the 
rule of reason.125 
4. Exclusive Distributorships and Dealing Promised by Sellers 
Often, instead of the manufacturer imposing restrictions upon 
where and to whom its distributors can resell its products, it is the 
manufacturer that agrees to the request of one distributor not to sell 
120. Com-Tel v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1982) (controlling free-
riders and efficient distribution rationales did not jibe with isolated exclusion of one 
potential purchaser). 
121. Graphic Products v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1578 n.32 (11th Cir. 1983) (no 
evidence that free riders were impairing the provision of adequate service). 
122. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. , 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980) (the purported 
purpose of the warranty fee imposed by the manufacturer on dealers selling outside of 
assigned territories could have been achieved simply by requiring those dealers to pay 
non-selling dealers for warranty service the non-selling dealers actually performed). 
But see American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249-1250 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (application of a rigid no less restrictive alternative test would place an 
undue burden on the ordinary conduct of business). 
123. E.g., Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 810 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
124. E.g., Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894,899 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
125. E.g., Electronics Communics. Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc. , 
129 F.3d 240, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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to competing distributors (thereby granting an exclusive distributor-
ship). Alternately, a seller of a component product may agree to the 
request of one user of the product not to sell to competitors of that 
buyer. The United States Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed such restraints. Nevertheless, it seems clear that such re-
strictions are also subject to the rule of reason.126 Moreover, since 
the impact of exclusive distributorships is to limit intrabrand compe-
tition, lower Federal courts in the United States analyze the poten-
tial anti-competitive impact of, and justifications for, exclusive 
distributorships in the same manner as vertical territorial, customer 
and location restraints.127 
The analysis under the rule of reason changes in the case of an 
agreement exclusively to supply a component product to one buyer. 
Here, the concern is not the loss of intrabrand competition, but rather 
the possible harm to interbrand competition. A recent case, Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 128 illustrates the pos-
sibility. There, a producer of a generic blood thinning drug obtained 
the agreement by a producer of a key ingredient for the drug not to 
sell the ingredient to other buyers. The Court of Appeals held that if 
the plaintiff (a potential competing producer of the generic blood 
thinning drug) could prove that the ingredient would not be available 
for a significant period of time from other sources, then the conduct 
could violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.129 
Antitrust plaintiffs in the United States have tried to avoid ap-
plication of the rule of reason to exclusive distributorships by invok-
ing the per se illegality of group boycotts. The theory works if two or 
more dealers collaborate to pressure a manufacturer into cutting off 
another dealer.130 An agreement, however, between a manufacturer 
and a single dealer to cut off another dealer is not a group boycott and 
not illegal per se.1a1 
5. Exclusive Dealing Promised by Buyers 
Exclusive dealing contracts, in which distributors or consumers 
promise only to purchase from one seller, are also subject to the rule 
of reason - or at least to an approach approximating the rule of rea-
son even if not always formally designated as such. At one time, it 
appeared that the United States Supreme Court would follow a sim-
126. See, e.g., Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 46 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
127. E.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
128. 386 F. 3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004). 
129. Id at 506, 508-510. 
130. E.g., Big Apple BMW v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1364 (3rd Cir. 
1992). 
131. See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998). 
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pler approach to such contracts. Specifically, in Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 13 2 the Supreme Court held that exclusive dealing con-
tracts for goods would violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act any time 
the contracts foreclosed competitors from selling to a substantial 
share of the line of commerce affected.133 The court found that the 
defendant oil company's contracts, which required gas stations sell-
ing its gasoline only to carry its gasoline, met this standard when the 
contracts covered 6. 7 percent of the gasoline sold in the relevant 
area.134 In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,135 however, the 
Supreme Court backed away from the simple approach of Standard 
Oil by stating that whether an exclusive dealing contract violated the 
antitrust law depended upon a range of factors beyond just the per-
cent of the market occupied by the contracts.136 Based upon this gui-
dance, lower United States Federal courts have examined a number 
of factors to determine the legality of exclusive dealing contracts in 
an approach that appears generally to follow the rule of reason, re-
gardless of whether the case arises under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act137 or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.138 
A primary factor in determining the anti-competitive impact of 
exclusive dealing contracts is the percentage of the relevant market 
foreclosed by such contracts to competitors of the defendant.139 This 
is consistent with the traditional concern that exclusive dealing con-
tracts can lead to monopoly power by foreclosing the market to com-
petitors of the defendant, or can preserve monopoly power by forcing 
new market entrants to create their own new distribution system. 
The need to quantify the percentage of the market foreclosed to com-
peting sellers can lead to a dispute as to what is the relevant mar-
ket140 or to dismissal if the plaintiff fails to meet the burden of proof 
on market definition.141 Significantly, the 6.7 percent market fore-
closure sufficient to condemn the agreements in Standard Oil would 
no longer be near enough to produce the same result today; instead 
132. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
133. ld at 299-300. 
134. ld at 314. 
135. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
136. Id at 329. 
137. E.g., Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetics v. Unity Hospital, 208 F.3d 655, 660 
(8th Cir. 2000). 
138. E.g., Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (1997). 
139. E.g., Eastern Food Services, Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic University Services 
Ass'n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2004). 
140. E.g., Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 127 F.3d 1157, 1163 (1997) 
(dispute over the whether the relevant market consisted just of sales to distributors of 
gasoline dispensing equipment, or whether it included the total sales of such equip-
ment, both to distributors and direct from manufacturers to major oil companies). 
141. E.g., Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of 
Tangipahoa Parish, 309 F.3d 836, 842 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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courts probably would require foreclosure greater than 30 or 40 per-
cent before ruling exclusive dealing contracts illegal. 142 
In addition to the share of the market covered by exclusive deal-
ing contracts, courts examine a number of other factors to determine 
the possible anticompetitive impact of the contracts. The duration of 
the contracts is of prominent importance here -the notion being that 
if the buyers can terminate the contracts on short notice, then com-
petitors can still enter the market by persuading buyers to terminate 
their exclusive dealing contracts143 - albeit, some courts have been 
willing to look at practical, as well as contractual, limitations on the 
ability of dealers to terminate exclusive dealing arrangements .144 
The presence or absence of entry barriers, 145 and disadvantages to 
alternative distribution channels beyond that foreclosed by exclusive 
dealing contracts,146 are also relevant. Finally, some courts have 
looked for direct evidence as to whether the exclusive dealing con-
tracts impacted competition; for example, a court might conclude 
based upon the success of rival sellers as well as price trends in the 
market that the exclusive dealing contracts pose no danger,147 or a 
court might demand that the plaintiff prove from evidence other than 
just market foreclosure that the probable effect of the restraint will 
be to raise prices above the competitive level or otherwise injure com-
petition.148 As a result of these added factors, some courts have up-
held exclusive dealing contracts even in situations in which the 
agreements covered a very large percentage of the market.149 
If the plaintiff can show an anticompetitive impact, then courts 
will examine the defendant's justifications for the exclusive dealing 
contracts.150 Among justifications courts have found persuasive are 
142. E.g., Stop & Shop Supermarket Co v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Is-
land, 373 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 2004). 
143. E.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 
1989) (exclusivity clause terminable on 30 days' notice normally is close to a de mini-
mus constraint). 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 12 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(notion that competitors could steal away distributors under terminable at will exclu-
sive dealing arrangement with dominant supplier was unrealistic). But see Omega 
Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (1997) (disregarding as un-
important expert testimony that distributors under easily terminable exclusive deal-
ing contracts would not abandon dominant supplier's line for a new product). 
145. E.g., CDC Tech., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs, Inc. 186 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1999). 
146. E.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 13-4 (3d Cir. 2005). 
147. E.g., Omega Environmental, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (1997) 
(noting entry into the market and expansion of a rival to the defendant, despite the 
exclusive dealing contracts, as well as industry trends of increasing output and de-
creasing prices). 
148. E.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F .2d 380, 393-395 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
149. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(agreements upheld despite covering at least 75 percent of the market). 
150. E.g., Eastern Food Services, Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic University Services 
Ass'n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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ensuring distributors dedicate themselves to promoting the manufac-
turer's products,15 1 and ensuring stability of supplies and prices.152 
While courts generally accept such justifications, the recent Microsoft 
decision illustrates some limitations. Microsoft had agreed with in-
ternet access providers (like AOL) to provide promotion and support 
for their services in exchange for the access providers not promoting 
(and limiting the distribution of software for) internet browsers that 
competed with Microsoft's Internet Explorer. Microsoft's justification 
was to keep software developers focused on applications for 
Microsoft's operating systems. The Court of Appeals held that this 
rationale, while not unlawful, was not a pro-competitive reason for 
the exclusive dealing contracts. 153 
Finally, in some cases, there can be a dispute over whether the 
challenged conduct is even an exclusive dealing contract. For exam-
ple, a seller might invoke Colgate to argue that refusing to sell to 
dealers carrying competing merchandise is unilateral conduct.154 
Also, some cases raise the issue of whether contracts that simply pro-
vide incentives for exclusive dealing, or limitations rather than 
prohibitions on buying from competitors, equal an unreasonable ex-
clusive dealing contract.155 The recent Microsoft decision provides an 
illustration. One part of the case involved contracts under which 
Microsoft required personal computer manufacturers to include an 
icon for Internet Explorer in order to receive the license to install the 
Windows operating system. The Court of Appeals treated this essen-
tially as exclusive dealing- the theory being that the manufacturers 
under such agreements would not install competing internet brows-
ers with another own icon because two browser icons could confuse 
customers and lead to more helpline calls.1 5 6 
151. E.g., Flash Electronics, Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F. 
Supp. 2d 379, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
152. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) 
(O,Connor, J., concurring). 
153. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court's 
opinion contains little explanation as to how this justification differed from justifica-
tions for exclusive dealing that courts have found acceptable. 
154. E.g. , Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 393 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
155. E.g., Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1257-
58 (5th Cir. 1988) (court allowed incentives for exclusive dealing); Empire Volk-
swagen v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (held that it 
is acceptable to preclude dealers from showing competing cars in the same 
showroom). 
156. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F .3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Not sur-
prisingly, the European Union also has confronted the issue of when it is legal for 
firms with s ignificant market power to provide incentives for exclusive dealing. E.g., 
British Airways Pic. v. Commission, Case T-219/99 (2003) (condemned loyalty bo-
nuses given by British Airways to travel agents designed to encourage the agents to 
push British Airways tickets over other airlines). 
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CoNCLUSION 
During the more than a century of their existence, United States 
antitrust laws have experienced cycles of greater and lesser vigor in 
their enforcement. For the last three decades, in large part due to the 
critique of the "Chicago school," the United States has been in ape-
riod of lesser enforcement of these laws. One significant manifesta-
tion of this trough has been increased judicial acceptance of vertical 
restraints on competition. Whether or not this acceptance has cre-
ated a significant divergence between the laws regarding vertical re-
straints on competition in the United States versus in Europe - as 
some writers have claimed 157 - is less obvious and depends upon the 
specific restraint involved. 
157. James C. Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel P. O'Brien & Michael Vita, A Compara· 
tiue Study of United States and European Union Approaches to Vertical Policy, work-
ing paper available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=699582. 
